Terrorism & Digital Ecosystems

Federico Borgonovo, Giulia Porrino, Silvano Rizieri Lucini, Propaganda Hybridation: pmc wagner exploitation of islamic state content

Abstract

The PMC Wagner is one of the main players that emerged during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The study aims to investigate the presence of communicative hybridisation in the communication of the PMC Wagner on Telegram. The study is based on a case study of a channel exploiting pro-IS propaganda and jihadist visual motifs with more than 100,000 subscribers. The analysis of the content related to the channel shows a good understanding of IS propaganda: those replicate the style of IS propaganda and are used to disseminate pro-Russia materials. Through the communicative hybridisation, the target audience expands to include extremist Muslims galvanized by jihadist propaganda and PMC Wagner veterans who fought in the civil war in Syria and who came into contact with the violent subculture typical of the Islamic State. The exploitation by PMC Wagner of different forms of communicative extremism is a phenomenon to be monitored as this strategy allows content to be modulated through styles, languages, and visual motifs.

Keywords

PMC Wagner, Jihad, Propaganda, Telegram, Media House

Ali Fisher, Time to be realistic about Swarmcast 2.0: How terrorists use WhatsApp

Abstract

This article addresses two significant gaps in the current literature. First it challenges the orthodox claims that Salafi-Jihadi are forced to use smaller platforms because of the success of ‘deplatforming’ strategies adopted by so-called internet giants and second it does this by highlighting the significant presence of Salafi-Jihadi networks on WhatsApp. With over two billion users, WhatsApp is an social giant by any estimation. 

Through the discussion of the networks on WhatsApp, the article demonstrates that while the Western metanarrative has long been accepted by the orthodoxy of Terrorism Studies, and is still resonates at events hosted by industry funded bodies, the challenge encapsulated by Swarmcast2.0 remains. Salafi-Jihadi groups and the media mujahidin maintain persistent networks which function across multiple platforms simultaneously, including networks on the some of the largest platforms. 

The paper argues for greater attention to be paid to an authentic understanding of the ways Salafi-Jihadi communicate shared meaning and maintain networks. It concludes, concludes there is a need for significantly greater understanding of the way Salafi-Jihadi networks are still able to operate on the largest platforms, requiring an understanding of dynamic networks in addition to the static content files they share.

Keywords

Swarmcast; networks; Salafi-Jihadi; terrorism; platforms;

Francesco Balucani – Fabio Ottaviani, L’Italia alla prova del fondamentalismo radicale islamico. Indagine sul polimorfismo della minaccia terroristica e analisi ragionata dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano in materia di antiterrorismo. Parte seconda

Abstract

This publication aims to analyze the most relevant features of today’s islamic terrorism, to list the critical issues that this kind of threath poses both in a strategic and a legal dimension, to examine the peculiarities and the attributes of the Italian legal system in terms of national security and counter-terrorism, and finally to analyze this issue in terms of international cooperation. The polymorphism and the irreducibility to pre-established schemes that have always distinguished the threath of terrorism require us to carry out an analysis free from generalizations, focused both on present days – foreign fighters, nuclear terrorism, Jihad 2.0, terrorism transnational – and historical past. Although in recent years the incidence of islamic terrorism has decreased more and more, probably as a consequence of the progressive dismantling of the Islamic State and the intensification of American search and destroy campaigns, conducted throught high-altitude military drones, satellite technologies and intelligence operations, we believe that it is appropriate to maintain high standards of security, since new potential threats may arrive unexpectedly and without great possibilities for prediction. The roots of the problem remain substantially unresolved – Islamic religious demands, the presence of political regimes close to the most extremist currents of the Islamic religion, the marginalization of Muslim populations within the global society, the presence of inter-ethnic conflicts and civil wars in regions of the world already affected by phenomena of poverty and by the externalities of climate change – and so it is possible that in the future the containment policies of Western societies may no longer be enough to contain the pressures arising from a a problem that we have repressed and suffocated, but certainly not completely eradicated. In any case, this period of calm could also be used to address the unresolved issues related to the definition of terrorism on an international level and the dilemmas of interstate cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism and intelligence, which may compromise the effectiveness of the policies to contain the terrorist threat developed both nationally and internationally. The following publication is divided into two parts, or sections: in the first one, which has been included in the past issue of the journal, we have dealt with the issues mentioned above, while in the second, which you are about to read, we will analyse in depth the protection of national security in the Italian legal system.

Keywords

Terrorismo, fondamentalismo jihadista, antiterrorismo, sicurezza nazionale, intelligence, cooperazione internazionale, terrorism, jihadism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, intelligence, international cooperation

Evolving security issues & perspectives

Giacomo Buoncompagni, Within the informative-cultural chaos. Migration issue, national politics and anti-Jewish conspiracy

Abstract

Among the various phenomena of hostility and aggression towards different groups, anti-Semitism has become increasingly prevalent in Europe in recent years.

Considering recent crises and the emergence of collective traumas, hate crimes and novel forms of anti-Semitism have materialized in political discourse and the digital sphere. This is due to the public and interactive nature of new information technologies.

The phenomenon of neo-anti-Semitism highlight’s identity issues in multicultural societies, specifically difficulties comprehending other cultures and histories or more recent transformations. This has significantly eroded the relationship between the public sphere and online societies, while at the same time encouraging anti-Semitic sentiments, conspiracy theories, infodemics, new forms of racism and denialism that are difficult to report even in the media. The overall objective of this study is to investigate the coverage of anti-migrant hate and obscured types of anti-Semitism. Despite being distinct topics, both are linked by the presence of stereotypical, occasionally aggressive, and confused narratives in the public discourse. Journalism frequently fails to identify and rectify these narratives, thus perpetuating information disorder.

Keywords

Migration; conspiracy; journalism; media; discrimination; hate speech, migrazione; cospirazione; giornalismo; media; discriminazione; discorso di odio

Kamil Yilmaz, Hate speech predicts engagement on social media: A case study from Turkey

Abstract

What drives engagement on social media has been the focus of social scientific inquiry especially in recent years. Among various established predictors of virality on social media are emotional language, language about in- and out-groups, and notions of positivity and negativity.  In light of prior work, this study explores whether hate speech in the form of demonization of a social group is associated with engagement on social media by using a case study from Turkey: The Gülen Movement (GM), a once-admired social movement that has been going through a decade-long demonization, stigmatization, criminalization and persecution. The results show that demonizing language against GM (a specific out-group) is a strong predictor of virality in three of the largest social media platforms in Turkey’s social media ecosystem: Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. The results also show that demonizing language about a specific out-group has the largest effect size compared to other well-established predictors of virality such as the moral-emotional language, language about the in-group and language about the (general) out-group.

Keywords

Hate speech, demonization, social-media, specific out-group, Gülen Movement, Turkey

FORMS OF INSURGENCIES, EXTREMISMS AND HATE CRIMES

Andrea Castronovo, Karenni Revolution: the centrality of border territories in Myanmar’s national insurgency

Abstract

In the aftermath of the 2021 military coup, hundreds of non-state armed groups have been established across Myanmar to fight the regime, known as State Administration Council (SAC). The newly formed revolutionary forces, generically called People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), have transitioned from poorly armed and uncoordinated small cells to structured, well-trained and semi-regular companies and battalions capable of operating through a wide range of guerrilla warfare tactics. After two years of war, the nation descended into a state of violence characterized by the collapse of legitimate central state authority, the regime’s countrywide scorched-earth campaigns against the population, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), an unprecedented humanitarian crisis and a failing economy. Myanmar has become a war-torn country in the heart of the fastest-growing region in the world: Southeast Asia. Although, the dominant Western narrative frames the current national crisis as a never-ending conflict, political deadlock or a failed state, what’s happening in Myanmar is a multidimensional Revolution that aims, not only to overthrow the military regime, but to redefine the socio-political structure of the entire country. By analyzing both the Karenni leading guerrilla force, the KNDF, and the interim Government of the ethnic State, the KSCC, this paper investigates how Karenni youth, coordinating with local Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and civil society groups, have established one of the most advanced anti-regime fronts in Myanmar.

Keywords

Myanmar, military coup, Revolution, PDF, Karenni State

Giacomo Buoncompagni, ‘Sexdemic’: counter genderbased hate crimes. Virtual practices, cyber-bodies, microcelebrity and sex crimes

Abstract

The various forms of participation on the web, such as likes, posts, tweets, leave ‘traces of our selves’, fragments of our identities that we are unaware of, that we cannot control and that we cannot delete.
In recent months, we have witnessed more and more diverse situations online, such as those involving groups of teenagers who use social networks to build identities, micro-celebrity paths and distribute photos/videos of beatings, torture, murders, but especially live suicides.
The causes and consequences of these forms of deviant behaviour, which are reproduced in the virtual dimension, are many and varied: depression, envy, the search for power and visibility, the transformation of a simple user into a cyber-victim, sometimes without even realising it, and the “telling off” on social networks, especially through self-produced videos and photos. Drawing on international sociological and psychological literature, this paper aims to reflect on some forms of online deviance related to ‘pathological’ communication practices concerning the body and (cyber) sexual violence.

Keywords

Sex; crime; digital media; celebrity; online reputation; bodies, hate speech; crimini sessuali; media digitali; celebrità; reputazione online; corpi

Francesco Balucani – Fabio Ottaviani, L’Italia alla prova del fondamentalismo radicale islamico. Indagine sul polimorfismo della minaccia terroristica e analisi ragionata dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano in materia di antiterrorismo. Parte prima

EMERGING THREAT ECOSYSTEMS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES

Abstract

This publication aims to analyze the most relevant features of today’s islamic terrorism, to list the critical issues that this kind of threath poses both in a strategic and a legal dimension, to examine the peculiarities and the attributes of the Italian legal system in terms of national security and counter-terrorism, and finally to analyze this issue in terms of international cooperation. The polymorphism and the irreducibility to pre-established schemes that have always distinguished the threath of terrorism require us to carry out an analysis free from generalizations, focused both on present days foreign fighters, nuclear terrorism, Jihad 2.0, terrorism transnational – and historical past. Although in recent years the incidence of islamic terrorism has decreased more and more, probably as a consequence of the progressive dismantling of the Islamic State and the intensification of American search and destroy campaigns, conducted throught high-altitude military drones, satellite technologies and intelligence operations, we believe that it is appropriate to maintain high standards of security, since new potential threats may arrive unexpectedly and without great possibilities for prediction. The roots of the problem remain substantially unresolved – Islamic religious demands, the presence of political regimes close to the most extremist currents of the Islamic religion, the marginalization of Muslim populations within the global society, the presence of inter-ethnic conflicts and civil wars in regions of the world already affected by phenomena of poverty and by the externalities of climate change and so it is possible that in the future the containment policies of Western societies may no longer be enough to contain the pressures arising from a a problem that we have repressed and suffocated, but certainly not completely eradicated. In any case, this period of calm could also be used to address the unresolved issues related to the definition of terrorism on an international level and the dilemmas of interstate cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism and intelligence, which may compromise the effectiveness of the policies to contain the terrorist threat developed both nationally and internationally. The following publication is divided into two parts, or sections: in the first one, which you are about to read, we will deal with the issues mentioned above, while in the second, which will be included in the next issue of the journal, we will deal in depth with the issue concerning the protection of national security in the Italian legal system.

Keywords

Terrorismo, fondamentalismo jihadista, antiterrorismo, sicurezza nazionale, intelligence, co- operazione internazionale / terrorism, jihadism, counter-terrorism, homeland security, intelli- gence, international cooperation

Federico Borgonovo – Ali Fisher, Mapping a Telegram-centred Accelerationist  Collective

Abstract

This paper aims to map the accelerationist collective known as Terrorgram and reconstruct its basic morphological characteristics through propaganda study and social network analysis. The core of the study focuses on digital ethnography within Telegram platform, and it is aimed at the recognition of narratives, communication objectives, techniques and strategies. And finally, a Social Network Analysis (SNA) is implemented, identifying actors and subgroups involved in pro-violence online propaganda within the the digital ecosystem.

Keywords

Accelerationism, right, propaganda, terrorgram, terrorism

Simone Castagna, Exploring the Telegram Hacker Ecosystem

Abstract

The study of hacker groups, their activities and the communities they form is becoming increasingly relevant in an even more digitalised world. Historically, academic research has portrayed hackers as solitary, misanthropic, and malevolent figures that reside within the depths of the underground web. This stereotype has led to a research focus only on the activities that occur within underground forums and markets. However, this narrow perspective is not entirely accurate, and it is crucial to understand the interactions and relationships that exist between hackers, even within more accessible and secure platforms such as Telegram. The current study employs a range of research techniques, including non-discriminative snowball sampling and social network analysis to explore the digital ecosystem of hacker groups on the Telegram instant messaging service. The aim of this research is to offer insights into the network’s organizational structure and dynamics, as well as to identify key actors, their relationships, and the dissemination patterns of content. The findings of this research provide an original approach to investigating the digital ecosystems of hacker groups, thereby enhancing the understanding of their structures, dynamics, and behaviours, and facilitating the development of effective strategies for monitoring, identifying, and countering their activities. Lo studio dei gruppi di hacker, delle loro attività e delle comunità che formano sta diventando sempre più rilevante in un mondo sempre più digitalizzato. Storicamente, la ricerca accademica ha dipinto gli hacker come figure solitarie, misantrope e malevole che risiedono nelle profondità del web underground.

Keywords

Hacker groups, Social Network Analysis, Telegram, Digital Ecosystems

Luca Cinciripini, La nuova sicurezza europea tra Baltico e Artico

Abstract

Following a geopolitical phase that has seen the Mediterranean at the center of European security studies, the northern part of the continent is assuming a new centrality. In particular, we are now witnessing the relevance of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic as new geopolitical sce- narios of confrontation between great powers, in particular Russia and the member countries of NATO. The Ukrainian conflict, in fact, is producing serious consequences in these regions as well, as in the case of the request for accession by Sweden and Finland to NATO, with a consequent increase in international tensions. In addition, the multilateral governance that has so far governed the fate of the Arctic, both in terms of security and scientific research, is being severely tested by the tough confrontation between Russia and the West. Furthermore, climate warming opens new trade routes and provides access to huge deposits of raw materials, accelerating the competition between the players also thanks to the inclusion of powers such as China. In the light of their geographical, political and military characteristics, it is therefore useful to observe the Baltic and the Arctic as two regions of peculiarity, with points of contact that link their future security scenarios.
Dopo una fase geopolitica che ha visto il Mediterraneo al centro degli studi di sicurezza europei, la parte settentrionale del continente sta assumendo una nuova centralità. In particolare, si as- siste ormai alla rilevanza del Mar Baltico e dell’Artico come nuovi scenari geopolitici di confron- to tra grandi potenze, in particolare la Russia e i Paesi membri della NATO. Il conflitto ucraino, infatti, sta producendo serie conseguenze anche in queste regioni, come nel caso della richiesta di adesione di Svezia e Finlandia alla NATO, con conseguente aumento di tensioni internazion- ali. In aggiunta, la governance multilaterale che ha sin qui retto le sorti dell’Artico, sia in termini di sicurezza che di ricerche scientifiche, è messa a dura prova dal duro confronto tra Russia e Occidente. Il riscaldamento climatico, inoltre, apre nuove rotte commerciali e fornisce accesso a immensi giacimenti di materie prime, accelerando la competizione tra gli attori anche grazie all’inserimento di potenze come la Cina. Alla luce delle caratteristiche geografiche, politiche e militari, risulta pertanto utile osservare Baltico e Artico come due regioni con caratteristiche peculiari ma con punti di contatto che ne legano gli scenari di sicurezza futuri.

Keywords

Artico, Baltico, Russia, NATO, UE

Rene D. Kanayama, Renewed Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Conflict – Cui Bono?

Abstract

Following the July 2022 4th Consultative Meeting of the heads of state of Central Asian Coun- tries at the Lake Issyk-Kul, hosted by Kyrgyzstan, and literally on the eve of a high-level summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Samarkand, where among other agenda, the regional powerhouse Iran, so far active as an observer state, formally submitted an application to join the regional geopolitical organization increasingly aspiring to become a global one, and Turkey, an invited guest, announced its preparedness to join the alliance in the future, fierce fighting flared up in the Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan, following a military incursion from the side of Tajikistan. Not only were the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sitting around the same table sipping tea when young Kyrgyz soldiers were losing their lives defending their homeland, the whole idea behind the summit hosted by Uzbekistan was originally prepared to increase the regional cooperation perspectives, not to watch such efforts disintegrate before the very eyes of the Central Asian and wider regional nations. Moreover, in less than a week, the 77th United Nations General Assembly gathering was to take place, bringing to New York the leaders of the very nations embroiled in another round of Central Asian border conflict – compelling the Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov to dedicate his address entirely to the renewed border dispute with Tajikistan.
Obviously, with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine confrontation and the situation around the Na- gorno-Karabakh recently aggravating to another level of military clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a question needs to be asked whether this new Kyrgyz-Tajik engagement is to be seen and analyzed on its own, or whether some other global mechanisms in the backdrop should be identified. The border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is certainly an issue in force for the past twenty years, having attained its very hot phase in April 2021, and a complex mix of causes needs to be addressed to understand the matter in question – from a lack of proper governance on both sides, decades long competition over water resources in the Fergana Valley, socioeconomic disparities in the geographical area far from their respective national capitals, proliferating organized crime including drug trafficking, and, not the least, the ever contrasting ethnic divide among the several nations of the region. The article will put less emphasis on historical data and perspectives, while maintaining a cer- tain measure of a chronological frame of reference, and instead will attempt to place the cur- rent Kyrgyz-Tajik border crisis into both regional context (as part of the ongoing phenomenon where currently all of the Central Asia gains significance among various global affairs) as well as the context of increasingly crucial global issues, including a proper use of water resources, food security and inter-ethnic symbiosis.

Dopo il 4° incontro consultivo dei capi di stato dei paesi dell’Asia centrale nel luglio 2022 pres- so il lago Issyk-Kul, ospitato dal Kirghizistan, e letteralmente alla vigilia di un vertice ad alto livello dell’Organizzazione per la cooperazione di Shanghai a Samarcanda, dove, tra l’altro, la potenza regionale Iran, finora attiva come stato osservatore, ha formalmente presentato do- manda per entrare a far parte dell’organizzazione geopolitica regionale sempre più aspirante a diventare globale, e la Turchia, un ospite invitato, ha annunciato la sua disponibilità ad aderire all’alleanza in futuro, aspri combattimenti sono divampati nella regione di Batken del Kirghi- zistan, a seguito di un’incursione militare dalla parte del Tagikistan. Non solo i presidenti del Kirghizistan e del Tagikistan erano seduti intorno allo stesso tavolo a sorseggiare il tè quando i giovani soldati kirghisi stavano perdendo la vita per difendere la loro patria, l’intera idea alla base del vertice ospitato dall’Uzbekistan era originariamente preparata per aumentare le pros- pettive di cooperazione regionale, e non vedere tali sforzi disintegrarsi davanti agli occhi stessi delle nazioni dell’Asia centrale e della regione più ampia. Inoltre, in meno di una settimana, si sarebbe tenuta la 77a riunione dell’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, portando a New York i leader delle stesse nazioni coinvolte in un altro round di conflitti di confine dell’Asia centrale, costringendo il presidente kirghiso Sadyr Japarov a dedicare interamente il suo dis- corso al rinnovato conflitto di confine con il Tagikistan.
Ovviamente, con il conflitto Russia-Ucraina in corso e la situazione intorno al Nagorno-Kara- bakh che si è recentemente aggravata a un altro livello di confronto militare tra Azerbaigian e Armenia, è necessario porsi una domanda se questo nuovo impegno kirghiso-tagiko debba essere visto e analizzato da solo, o se dovrebbero essere identificati altri meccanismi globali sullo sfondo. La disputa di confine tra Kirghizistan e Tagikistan è certamente una questione in vigore negli ultimi vent’anni, avendo raggiunto la sua fase molto calda nell’aprile 2021, e per comprendere la questione in questione è necessario affrontare un insieme complesso di cause
– dalla mancanza di un buon governo da entrambe le parti, dalla concorrenza decennale per le risorse idriche in Val Fergana, disparità socioeconomiche nell’area geografica lontana dalle rispettive capitali nazionali, proliferazione della criminalità organizzata compreso il traffico di droga, e, non ultimo, la sempre contrastante divisione etnica tra le diverse nazioni della regione.
L’articolo porrà meno enfasi sui dati storici e sulle prospettive, pur mantenendo una certa misura di un quadro di riferimento cronologico, e cercherà invece di collocare l’attuale cri- si del confine tra Kirghizistan e Tagikistan in entrambi i contesti regionali (come parte del fenomeno in corso in cui attualmente tutta l’Asia centrale acquista importanza tra i vari affari globali) così come il contesto di questioni globali sempre più cruciali, tra cui un uso corretto delle risorse idriche, la sicurezza alimentare e la simbiosi interetnica.

Keywords

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Central Asia, Regional Security, post-USSR Conflict Zone, Water Re- sources

META SPACES:  COMMUNITIES, THREATS  AND INTERACTIONS

Barbara Lucini, Vetting e processi di radicalizzazione come pratiche di comunità digitali: dai TRA-I al metaverso

Abstract

This paper focuses on key findings emerged from the research activities conducted within the H2020 European project CounteR – Countering Radicalisation for a Safer World Privacy-first situational awareness platform for violent terrorism and crime prediction, counter radicalisa- tion and citizen protection.
The central theme concerns vetting processes and their methodologies applied in multiple ecosystems for both Islamic and far-right radicalisation processes.
The theoretical perspective that we want to focus on is related to the cultural-narrative ap- proaches and the declinations that these can operationally have in the field of socio-cultural intelligence.
The methodological perspective instead relates to the understanding of the context and oper- ational ecosystem of such processes and of those weak signals or risk factors that can be useful to Law Enforcement Agencies to adapt and adjust TRA-I (Terrorism Risk Assessment Instru- ments) models to the contemporary and varied radicalisation processes.
The result is a work of primary importance for national security in a global context of strong radicalisation, for its methodological-operational implications and for the theoretical reflec- tions that make it worthy of further study.

Il presente articolo si focalizza su alcuni risultati emersi dalle attività di ricerca condotte nell’ambito del progetto europeo H2020 – CounteR – Countering Radicalisation for a Safer World Privacy-first situational awareness platform for violent terrorism and crime prediction, counter radicalisation and citizen protection.
Il tema centrale riguarda i processi di vetting e le loro metodologie applicate in molteplici eco- sistemi sia per i processi di radicalizzazione islamica sia per quelli relativi all’estrema destra. La prospettiva teorica che si vuole porre all’attenzione è relative agli approcci culturali – narr- ativi e alle declinazioni che questi possono operativamente avere nell’ambito della socio-cul- tural intelligence.
La prospettiva metodologica invece si relaziona con la comprensione del contesto ed ecosis- tema operativo di tali processi e di quei segnali deboli o risk factors che possono essere utili alle Law Enforcement Agencies per adattare e adeguare i modelli di TRA-I (Terrorism Risk Assessment Instruments) ai contemporanei e variegati processi di radicalizzazione.
Ne risulta un lavoro di primaria importanza per la sicurezza nazionale in un contesto globale di forte radicalizzazione, per le ricadute metodologiche-operative, per le riflessioni teoriche che lo rendono meritevole di ulteriori approfondimenti.

Keywords

Radicalisation, Extremism, Vetting, Islamic, Right – Wing, Socio-Cultural Intelligence, Radi- calizzazione, Estremismo, Islamico, Estrema Destra, Socio-Cultural Intelligence.

Kamil Yilmaz – Farangiz Atamuradova, A comparative analysis of ISIS Channels On Telegram

Abstract

With the increased presence of social media and online messaging platforms in daily lives of individuals came the threat of its appropriation by terrorist groups to spread their narratives, recruit individuals, and serve as a communication channel among members of the group. This research focuses on comparing two Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)Telegram channels – an interactive and broadcast channel – to compare the tactics and strategies employed by the two channels. In particular, the research assesses the discursive strategies presented in both channels, especially those pertaining to the representation of the in- and out-group by the channel moderators as well as followers. The combined analysis of the posts on two ISIS-chan- nels is beneficial for researchers, practitioners, as well as policy makers as it sheds light to how one single group employs different tactics and strategies to communicate their message, polar- ize followers’ viewpoint, and maintain the existence of and support for the terrorist group as a whole, despite its territorial defeat.

Keywords

ISIS, Telegram, terrorism, critical discourse analysis, CDA

Daniele Maria Barone, Social bots and synthetic interactions to stage digital extremist armies

Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI)-made bots for social media platforms are becoming increasingly sophisticated and able to impersonate average users, developing either as valuable AI tools in the communication field or as an instrument for online deception.
As AI keeps advancing, also terrorist organizations will benefit from these technological de- velopments to increase the efficiency of their use of social media. For instance, they could increasingly avoid being flagged by users or detected and banned by the platforms, supporting radicalization or propaganda with less risk while gaining greater resonance.
From this perspective, the analysis will firstly focus on how social bots work, their role in help- ing to perceive synthetic interactions as authentic interactions, and their potential contribu- tion to social manipulation. Then, the paper will delineate how AI-bot developments intersect with terrorist or extremist communication environments.
I social media bot creati attraverso l’intelligenza artificiale (IA) diventano sempre più sofisticati e in grado di imitare con maggiore efficacia il comportamento degli utenti. Questo li ha resi sia strumenti particolarmente validi nel settore della comunicazione sia una risorsa utile per ingannare gli utenti.
Con l’avanzamento e la diffusione dell’IA, anche le organizzazioni terroristiche potranno ben- eficiare di questi sviluppi in campo tecnologico, migliorando la loro efficenza nell’utilizzo dei social media. Ad esempio, i social bot potrebbero aiutare le organizzazioni terroristiche a diminuire le possibilità di essere segnalati dagli utenti e sospesi dalle piattaforme social, sup- portando i loro processi di radicalizzazione e diffondendo la loro propaganda con un rischio inferiore ma garantendo una maggiore risonanza.
Partendo da questa prospettiva, dopo aver analizzato il funzionamento dei social bot, in quale misura questi ultimi possono favorire la percezione di interazioni sintetiche come autentiche ed il loro contributo alla manipolazione sociale, la ricerca delineerà le aree principali attra- verso cui lo sviluppo tecnologico dei bot si interseca con i contesti comunicativi di gruppi terroristici o estremisti.

Keywords

Social media bot, jihad, far-right, conspiracy theories

Mirosław Karpiuk, Crisis management vs. cyber threats

Abstract

An effective response to cyber crises is determined not only by having forces and resources ade-
quate to such a threat, but having appropriate regulations in this regard are also important. The  European Union has not yet developed common standards to deal with the threats that cause  such crises, instead leaving crisis management in the event of such crises situations caused by  cyber-attacks firmly to national legislation.

Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1086 of 23 June 2021 on the Establishment of a  Common Cyberspace Unit (OJ EU L 237, p. 1) states that Member States and relevant EU  institutions, bodies and agencies should ensure a coordinated EU response to, and recovery  from, large-scale cyber incidents and crises. In this situation, it is necessary to swiftly and ef- fectively mobilise operational resources for mutual assistance. In order to provide an effective  coordinated response to cyber crises, relevant actors should be able to share best practices and  ensure necessary preparedness. Their operation should take into account existing processes  and the expertise of the different cybersecurity communities. In turn, according to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1584 of 13 September 2017  on the Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises (OJ EU L  239, p. 36), Member States and EU institutions should establish an EU Cybersecurity Cri- sis Response Framework integrating the objectives and modalities of cooperation. The EU  Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework should, in particular, identify the relevant actors,  EU institutions and Member State authorities, at all necessary levels – technical, operational,  strategic – and develop standard operating procedures that define the way in which these co- operate within the context of EU crisis management mechanisms. Emphasis should be placed  on enabling the exchange of information without undue delay and coordinating the response  during large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises.

Keywords

Crisis management, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, essential service

You can download the full magazine files in PDF by clicking here

FOCUS SUL CONFLITTO UCRAINO

Marco Lombardi, Russia-Ucraina: oltre la Guerra Ibrida, verso il Techno-Cognitive Warfare

Abstract

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict unexpectedly brought war to Europe.

At present (end of March 2022) I do not consider any conclusive scenario to be foreseeable: to- day the most optimistic forecast is contained in the uncertainty of an evolving event, for which everything is possible. But this brief note, which introduces others that follow dedicated to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, focuses on what so far already constitutes predictably persistent results in the medium to long term.

Now we are at the Total Hybrid War in which the dimensions of the conflict overlap, interfere, produce an escalation of effects in different contexts: no conflict had yet unfolded in this artic- ulated form, where they are no longer needed and the predictive and interpretative drivers of the scenarios fail. This is the first Total Hybrid War that has surpassed itself, paving the way for the now present Techno-Cognitive Warfare.

The characteristics of the Ukrainian Russian confrontation can be traced back to some emerg- ing themes: the overlapping of the dimensions of the conflict; the centrality of strategic com- munication; the multiplication of actors in the field.

Although the conflict is still ongoing, however, some signs of permanent change are already evident. In the paper, I discuss only a few, which concern the change in the paradigm of the now techno-cognitive war, the broad re-modeling of the meaning of cyberspace, the central role of information and communication, and, also, a consequent different mode of negotiation between the parties to accelerate the peace process.

The conclusions add to the previous reflections two hopes.

The first concerns our capacity for de-escalation: wars, this one, in particular, has clearly shown how we can risk being stuck in a symmetrical process of escalation so that every action (in every dimension of the conflict) is answered with an action of a greater degree (in every other dimension of the conflict). It is a trap, also favored by technologies, which has configured an automatism, a practice of “taken for granted”, which can only be interrupted by a conscious and responsible choice.

The second, which takes the form of advice, concerns the individual cognitive equipment that each one must assume for the governance of the flow of communication in which he is immersed. Therefore, I emphasize what I call the Principle of Maximum Protection:

• any information is false until proven otherwise. and the Principle of Maximum Effectiveness:
• every piece of information is true for its target audience.

I expect a lasting more than ten years of the conflict that has just begun, albeit blanded and conveyed through actions that will focus on one or the other dimension (cyber, kinetic, eco- nomic, social, etc.) in an exclusive way, if those who will have to govern the confrontation will be able to avoid the simultaneous overlapping of the effects generated by the actions carried out in each dimension. In practice, we now need to learn to govern a widespread, subthreshold, and continuous global conflict: without surrendering to Cognitive Warfare as a replacement for “Peacefare”.

Il conflitto russo-ucraino ha inaspettatamente portato la guerra in Europa.

Allo stato attuale (fine marzo 2022) non reputo prevedibile alcuno scenario conclusivo: oggi la previsione più ottimista è contenuta nell’incertezza di un evento in evoluzione, per il quale tutto è possibile. Ma questa breve nota, che ne introduce altre che seguono dedicate al con- flitto tra Russia e Ucraina, si concentra su quanto finora già costituisce dei risultati prevedibil- mente persistenti nel medio-lungo periodo.

Ora siamo alla Guerra Ibrida totale in cui le dimensioni del conflitto si sovrappongono, inter- feriscono, producono una escalation di effetti in contesti diversi: ancora non si era dispiegato in questa forma articolata alcun conflitto, dove non servono più e i driver predittivi e interpre- tativi degli scenari falliscono. Questa è la prima Guerra Ibrida Totale che ha superato sé stessa, aprendo la via all’ormai presente Guerra Tecno-Cognitiva.

Le caratteristiche del confronto russo ucraino possono essere ricondotte ad alcuni temi emer- genti: il sovrapporsi delle dimensioni del conflitto; la centralità della comunicazione strategi- ca; la moltiplicazione degli attori sul campo.

Benché a conflitto ancora in corso, tuttavia, alcuni segni di cambiamento permanente sono già evidenti. Nel paper mi soffermo solo su alcuni, che riguardano il cambiamento del paradigma della guerra ormai tecno-cognitiva, la ri-modellazione ampia del significato di spazio ciberne- tico, il ruolo centrale dell’informazione e comunicazione e, anche, una conseguente diversa modalità di negoziazione tra le parti per accelerare il processo di pace.

Le conclusioni aggiungono alle riflessioni precedenti due auspici.

Il primo riguarda la nostra capacità di de-escalation: le guerre, questa in particolare, ha mo- strato con chiarezza come si possa rischiare di restare bloccati in un processo simmetrico di escalation, per cui a ogni azione (in ogni dimensione del conflitto) si risponde con una azione di grado maggiore (in ogni altra dimensione del conflitto). Il secondo, che assume la forma di un consiglio, riguarda l’attrezzatura cognitiva individuale che ciascuno deve assumere rispetto al governo del flusso di comunicazione in cui è immerso secondo il Principio di Massima Tutela e il Principio di Massima Efficacia.

Keywords

Hybrid Warfare, Cognitive Warfare, Cyberspace, Ukraine, Russia

Stefano Marinelli, War and Crimes against Peace: Avenues to Prosecute Russia’s Aggression of Ukraine

Abstract

On February 24, 2022, the Russian attack on Ukraine provoked a strong international commu- nity reaction, in terms of diplomatic condemnation of Russia and support for Ukraine. There is an international consensus on the qualification of the facts that have occurred as a crime of aggression, and an unprecedented political support for Ukraine. Nevertheless, international justice does not have the possibility to prosecute those responsible for the crime.

The article presents the structural obstacles of international law in prosecuting the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine, in particular by the International Criminal Court, and illustrates possible alternatives to bring those responsible to justice. The article presents the strong and coherent reaction of the international community to the Russian military inter- vention, with unprecedented unity in the United Nations General Assembly, and a majority in the Security Council stopped exclusively by the Russian veto. Then, the article examines the international prohibition of the use of force, and the justifications put forward by Russia to support the legality of the operation. The Russian reasons, based on self-defense and on the purpose of protecting the populations of Donbas from genocide, prove to be unfounded. The analysis therefore concludes that the attack on Ukraine constitutes a manifest act of aggression. The study then examines the criminalization of the aggression by the International Criminal Court, presenting the jurisdictional limits that prevent the Court from prosecuting the crime in this circumstance: unlike other international crimes that the ICC is already investigating on the Ukrainian territory (crimes of war, crimes against humanity) the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction for the crime of aggression committed by individuals of states that are not party to the Rome Statute.

Finally, alternative mechanisms for bringing justice to the Ukrainian aggression are examined: from the trial in a national court, which has the problem of immunities and of lack of expertise in prosecuting international crime, to the creation of an ad hoc or hybrid tribunal.

Il 24 febbraio 2022, l’attacco della Federazione Russa all’Ucraina ha provocato una forte re- azione della comunità internazionale in termini di condanna diplomatica della Russia e di sostegno all’Ucraina. Nonostante il consenso internazionale nella qualifica dei fatti occorsi, e il sostegno politico senza precedenti, la giustizia internazionale sembra impossibilitata a perseguire i responsabili del crimine. L’articolo presenta gli ostacoli strutturali del diritto inter- nazionale nel perseguire il crimine di aggressione commesso contro l’Ucraina, in particolare da parte della Corte Penale Internazionale, e illustra possibili alternative per fare giustizia sul

crimine. Dopo aver presentato la reazione unitaria della comunità internazionale all’interven- to militare russo, con un’unità senza precedenti nell’Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite, e una maggioranza nel Consigli di Sicurezza fermata esclusivamente dal veto russo, l’articolo prende in esame il divieto internazionale di uso della forza e le giustificazioni avanzate dalla Russia per sostenere la legalità dell’operazione. Le ragioni russe, fondate sull’autodifesa e sulla finalità di proteggere le popolazioni del Donbas da un genocidio, si rivelano infondate. Si conclude quindi che l’attacco all’Ucraina costituisce un chiaro atto di aggressione. L’analisi esamina poi la criminalizzazione dell’aggressione da parte della Corte Penale Internazionale, presentando i limiti giurisdizionali che impediscono alla Corte di perseguire il crimine in questa circostanza: a differenza di altri crimini internazionali su cui ha già iniziato attività di indagine (crimini di guerra, crimini contro l’umanità) la Corte non può esercitare la propria giurisdizione per il crimine di aggressione commesso da individui di Stati che non sono parte allo Statuto di Roma. Infine, si prendono in esame meccanismi alternativi per fare giustizia sull’aggressione Ucraina: dal processo in un tribunale nazionale, che ha problemi di immu- nità e di specializzazione nel perseguire il crimine internazionale, fino alla creazione di un tribunale ad hoc o ibrido.

Keywords

Russia, Ukraine, International law, War crimes

Daniele Maria Barone, Russia-Ukraine conflict: digital assets chronicles in times of war

Abstract

The economic catastrophe caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised questions on the role of digital assets in this conflict. On the one hand, how crypto assets could be exploited by Moscow to circumvent international sanctions and, on the other hand, how crypto can be useful as a crowdfunding tool to finance the Ukrainian military sector.

This context turned a spotlight on the companies operating in the digital assets field, highlight- ing the controversies raised by the collision of the neutrality of the cryptocurrency sector with a humanitarian crisis.

With this premises, based on events and statements of the first few weeks after the Russian invasion began, this research is aimed at answering the following questions: how much can digital assets help in financing the military sector of a State? Can digital assets be a reliable alternative to international financial isolation? In which way could this conflict affect the cryp- tocurrency sector?

La catastrofe economica causata dall’invasione russa dell’Ucraina ha sollevato numerose do- mande sul ruolo che i digital asset potrebbero ricoprire in questo conflitto. Da un lato, il potenziale sfruttamento delle criptovalute da parte di Mosca per eludere le sanzioni economi- che e, dall’altro, la funzione delle criptovalute nel finanziamento al settore militare ucraino attraverso il crowdfunding.

Questo contesto ha acceso un faro sulle compagnie operanti nel settore dei digital asset, facen- do emergere le controversie generate dalla collisione tra la neutralità delle criptovalute con una crisi umanitaria.

Con tali premesse, basandosi su avvenimenti e dichiarazioni delle prime settimane dall’inizio dell’invasione russa, questa ricerca ha la finalità di rispondere alle seguenti domande: quanto possono aiutare le criptovalute nel finanziamento al settore militare di uno stato? Possono le criptovalute essere un’alternativa valida all’isolamento finanziario internazionale? In che modo il conflitto russo-ucraino ha un impatto nel settore delle criptovalute?

Keywords

Ukraine, hybrid warfare, cryptocurrencies, digital assets

Federico Borgonovo, Azov Battalion: Extreme Right-Wing Militarization and Hybrid Warfare

Abstract

This article analyzes the origins and features of the Azov Battalion. A hybrid weapon, which fight inside a multivariate hybrid conflict composed by a combination of urban warfare, propa- ganda, and politics. The Azov Battalion represent one of the clearest examples of the increasing complexity of warfare. Complexity and hybridization are due to the growing number and di- versity of actors involved. The Russo-Ukrainian conflicts no longer remain local; instead, from 2014 to 2022 has increasingly attracted external actors, as right-wing extremists and extend to the Internet. This analysis, try to explain how Azov Battalion became such an effective weapon and what could be its outcome after the war. This aim was achieved by reconstructing the fun- damental historical steps and then theorising the so-called Azov system. The latter is a model that synthesises Azov’s hybrid capabilities acquired through its diversification and attempts to illustrate the high degree of complexity of military systems fighting in hybrid contexts.

Keywords

Azov, Hybrid, Ideology, Ukraine, Army, War, Extremist

Marco Zaliani, The importance of the Cyber battleground in the Russo-Ukrainian war

Abstract

The increasingly hybrid nature of conflicts has become even more evident in the recent re-ig- nition of the never-dead Russian-Ukraine crisis. The new chapter of this conflict, which arose from the Russian military invasion of Ukrainian territory, was characterized by massive use of hybrid instruments of the conflict that went hand in hand with the military one. In this con- text, the cyber dimension of the conflict has reaffirmed its central role. As it is now an integral part of these conflicts and no longer ancillary to them. Starting from a study of the implemen- tation of cyber-arsenals used in the Ukrainian context, we want to give a more precise image of this type of weapons which, just like conventional arsenals, are exploited to achieve specific objectives by a variety of actors. In fact, in this conflict, the “cyber-line ups” that have seen state and non-state actors intervening alongside both Russia and Ukraine are also indicative. From these considerations, one can get an idea of the current role of cyber in the context of new hybrid conflicts and specifically outline the scenarios that the Russo-Ukrainian conflict may cause in cyberspace even after hostilities are over.

Keywords

Ukraine, cyber, hybrid warfare

Luca Cinciripini, The hybrid response of the EU and NATO to the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Abstract

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine embodies the main features of hybrid war-fare. Alongside the military dimension, the use of propaganda tools, disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks has fully emerged so far, as well as the multiplicity of state and non-state actors involved. Faced with this complexity, the European Union (EU) and NATO, unable to make full use of the military instrument to contain the consequences of the conflict, have put in place a multidimensional response. Up to now, it has been articulated in the use of both hard and soft power tools that have transversally involved different sectors. On the one hand, therefore, there was the supply of military equipment to the ukrainian front. On the other hand, lawfare instruments such as economic sanctions have been put in place, as well as trade, financial and energy measures aimed at isolating Russia from the rest of the international
community. Considering the factors that have long been observed in the field of international security studies, the future context will be increasingly dominated by hybrid warfare and the need for various actors to avoid open military clashes. The response of the EU and NATO to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis could, on the one hand, highlight the difficulties of the two organizations in fully transforming themselves into global players in the framework of international security and defence. On the other hand, could be a first step toward the exercise of a potentially replicable hybrid power in the management of future crises.

Keywords

Ukraine, Russia, EU, NATO, hybrid warfare

NAVIGARE SCENARI IBRIDI: PROSPETTIVE

Giacomo Buoncompagni, L’Amore Altruistico in tempi di guerra e pandemia

Abstract

Pitirim A. Sorokin, a Russian sociologist naturalised in the United States and a leading figure in 20th century sociology, stated that historical and techno-cultural changes have not always produced positive results within societies, but at times even negative (or more precisely, ‘de- structive’) ones: individualism, antagonism, an excess of technology and rationality, and in particular the fall of the bonds of solidarity towards the different and the loss of the feeling of belonging (Mangone 2015; Cimagalli 2010; Marletti 2018; Perrotta 2016).

Altruism can also be one of the indispensable ingredients of social life, useful for preventing crises and conflicts.

No society can exist without an “altruistic and creative love” that has as its aim the “altruisa- tion” of individuals and social institutions: a complex process/project capable of encompassing the emotional, supra-rational and spiritual aspects of human relations (including online), start- ing from the idea that all men can recognise themselves in certain moral principles, eternal and universal.

Considering the current pandemic and war scenarios, the aim of the paper is to illustrate the main theoretical lines of Sorokin’s scientific thought, which made sociology a “science at the service of humanity” useful also for the study of disasters, i.e. all those events involving con- junctions of physical conditions and definitions of human damage and social disorders (e.g. natural disasters, wars and cyber attacks).

Pitirim A. Sorokin, sociologo russo naturalizzato statunitense, figura di spicco della sociologia del XX secolo, affermava che i mutamenti storici e tecno-culturali non sempre hanno prodotto risultati positivi all’interno delle società, ma a tratti anche negativi (o più precisamente “di- struttivi”): individualismo, antagonismo, eccesso di tecnica e di razionalità, ed in particolare la caduta dei vincoli di solidarietà nei confronti del diverso e della perdita del sentimento di appartenenza (Mangone 2015; Cimagalli 2010; Marletti 2018; Perrotta 2016).

L’altruismo può essere uno degli ingredienti indispensabili alla vita sociale, utile per prevenire crisi e conflitti.

Nessuna società può esistere, infatti, senza un “amore altruistico e creativo” che abbia come fine “l’altruizzazione” degli individui e delle istituzioni sociali: un processo/progetto comples- so in grado di comprendere gli aspetti emotivi, sovra-razionali e spirituali delle relazioni uma-

ne (anche online), partendo dall’idea che tutti gli uomini possono riconoscersi in determinati principi morali, eterni ed universali.

Considerando gli attuali scenari di pandemia e di guerra, lo scopo del paper è quello di illustra- re le principali linee teoriche del pensiero scientifico di Sorokin, che ha fatto della sociologia una “scienza al servizio dell’umanità” utile anche per lo studio dei disastri, cioè di tutti quegli eventi che coinvolgono congiunzioni di condizioni fisiche e definizioni di danno umano e disturbi sociali (ad esempio, calamità naturali, guerre e cyberattacchi).

Keywords

Sorokin, altruism, media, digital, crisis, covid19, war

Daisy Marcolongo, Gestione dell’emergenza Covid-19: dalla teoria all’analisi. Il caso Bergamo

Abstract

L’intento dell’elaborato è quello di analizzare, dal punto di vista organizzativo e comunica- tivo, la gestione dell’emergenza Covid-19 in Italia, rivolgendo un’attenzione particolare alla provincia di Bergamo. Al fine di raggiungere tale intento sono stati utilizzati due strumenti di ricerca: l’intervista semi-strutturata ad amministratori locali, Protezione civile e volontari e il questionario strutturato alla popolazione. Dallo studio in profondità è emersa l’incredibile capacità degli enti locali e dei volontari di organizzarsi per fronteggiare l’emergenza senza indicazioni precise e in assenza di dispositivi di protezione, utilizzando conoscenze pregresse e piani di prevenzione non aggiornati. La gestione dell’emergenza in Italia è stata caratterizzata da un susseguirsi di DPCM e ordinanze regionali che hanno regolato il comportamento dei cittadini e l’apertura o chiusura di esercizi commerciali, luoghi di ritrovo e centri sportivi. Inizialmente le misure sono state accolte in modo favorevole dalla popolazione, tuttavia, sono emerse serie difficoltà di gestione della comunicazione; infatti, si evidenzia un uso scorretto dei canali social ufficiali del governo utilizzati per diffondere, anticipatamente e senza un’ade- guata analisi comunicativa, notizie contenute in documenti ufficiali, aumentando incertezza tra popolazione e amministratori locali.

Keywords

Covid-19, crisis management, Bergamo

Federico Prizzi, Il Cultural Intelligence e la Negoziazione Operativa nelle Aree di Crisi

Abstract

La Negoziazione Operativa è una delle attività più importanti che possono essere richieste a un etnografo di guerra. Essa consiste in tutte quelle trattative svolte in supporto alle operazioni militari, sia in tempo di pace che di guerra, con le autorità locali (formali e informali), con personale militare e paramilitare, con i rappresentanti di organizzazioni internazionali così come con comuni cittadini. In particolare, la negoziazione consiste in una necessità che due o più parti hanno di trovare un accordo accettato da tutti i contendenti. Accordo che deve essere vantaggioso per gli interessi di ciascuna delle parti coinvolte. Differisce, pertanto, dalla media- zione poiché quest’ultima necessita della presenza di un terzo attore percepito, dai due o più contendenti, come neutrale e imparziale. Infine, differisce, dalla negoziazione operativa con- dotta dalle forze di polizia, perché quest’ultima è strettamente legata alla liberazione di ostaggi.

Keywords

Cultural intelligence, cultural diplomacy, negoziazione operativa, aree di crisi

Rene D. Kanayama, Events in Kazakhstan’s Almaty of January 2022 – Grass-root Revolt or Terrorism Inspired Insurgency?

Abstract

While the world in March 2022 is immersed in yet another military conflict on the territory of ex-Soviet Union, the Year of the Tiger started to show from its very beginning that solving various disputes is fastest through means of violence, and its subsequent suppression by means of power. This time it was on the territory of Kazakhstan, and the cause for outbreak of vio- lence in Almaty and elsewhere between January 5 and 7, unseen in this magnitude so far in Kazakhstan, may have been benign in its nature – ever growing prices of fuel, exponentiated by ever expanding poverty gap in Kazakh society.

However, the instantaneous and extremely tough measures taken by the country’s leader- ship – coupled with immediate involvement of military forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization – indicated that much more than a mere overruling of popular dissent was at stake, and in order to attain its objective to silence the opposition, a clear and robust message had to be sent across.

Kazakhstan, in its 30 years of independence, has probably not been utterly immune to various types of disputes stemming from uneven distribution of wealth – certainly a long-term rule by one and only Nursultan Nazarbaev brought some “guarantees” of stability – but the extend of chaos, public disruption and the amount of blood spilled during the countermanding of re- bellion indicates that the relatively peaceful period of country’s post-Soviet development may be over and the oil and uranium rich nation needs to contend with both foreign interference as well as internal changes.

The events classified by some as insurgency, by some as a terrorist attempt to overthrow the lo- cal or perhaps even national government, and by some as a trivial fight between the tribal clans aiming at control of the nation’s riches and the future, may have lasted not long – everything happened almost as unexpectedly and swiftly as a squall coming out of nowhere – but were a testimony to the fact that the political and economic status quo in any of the post-Soviet republics is not a long-term matter, and instead it can change at a whim of those having an access to both means and desires to alter the established ways. This article examines the vari-

ous viewpoints of both the possible causes of Almaty events of January 2022, as well as future ramifications for security status in the region, and perhaps also beyond.

Mentre il mondo nel marzo 2022 è immerso nell’ennesimo conflitto militare sul territorio dell’ex Unione Sovietica, l’Anno della Tigre ha iniziato a mostrare fin dall’inizio che la solu- zione di varie controversie è più veloce attraverso la violenza, e la sua successiva soppressione per mezzo del potere. Questa volta si trovava nel territorio del Kazakistan, e la causa delle pro- teste ad Almaty il 5 gennaio potrebbe essere stata di natura benigna – prezzi sempre crescenti del carburante, a causa del divario di povertà sempre crescente nella società kazaka.

Tuttavia, le misure istantanee ed estremamente dure prese dalla leadership del Paese – in- sieme al coinvolgimento immediato delle forze militari dell’Organizzazione del Trattato di sicurezza collettiva – ha indicato che era in gioco molto più di un semplice annullamento del dissenso popolare, e per raggiungere il suo obiettivo di mettere a tacere l’opposizione, doveva essere inviato un messaggio chiaro e forte.

Non si può dire che il Kazakistan, nei suoi 30 anni di indipendenza, sia stato immune da vari tipi di contenziosi derivanti dalla distribuzione diseguale della ricchezza – certamente un governo a lungo termine di un solo e solo Nursultan Nazarbaev ha portato “garanzie” di stabilità – ma indica l’estensione del caos, il disordine pubblico e la quantità di sangue versato durante la revoca della ribellione che il periodo relativamente pacifico dello sviluppo post-sovietico del Paese potrebbe essere terminato e la nazione ricca di petrolio e uranio deve fare i conti sia con l’interferenza straniera che con i cambiamenti interni.

Gli eventi classificati da alcuni come ribellione, da alcuni come tentativo terroristico di rove- sciare il governo locale o forse anche nazionale, e da alcuni come una banale lotta tra i clan tribali che mirano al controllo del futuro della nazione, potrebbe essere durato non a lungo

• tutto accadde quasi inaspettatamente e rapidamente come una burrasca proveniente dal nulla – ma erano una testimonianza del fatto che lo status quo politico ed economico in una qualsiasi delle repubbliche post-sovietiche non è una questione a lungo termine, e invece può cambiare per un capriccio di coloro che hanno accesso sia ai mezzi che ai desideri di alterare i modi stabiliti. Questo articolo esamina i vari punti di vista di entrambe le possibili cause degli eventi di Almaty del gennaio 2022, così come le future ramificazioni per lo stato di sicurezza nella regione, e forse anche oltre.

Keywords

Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Terrorism, Insurgency, Regional Security, Coup d’état

Ali Fisher – Nico Prucha, “Working and Waiting”: The Salafi-Jihadi movement on Telegram in 2021

Abstract

Salafi-Jihadi groups adopted the Telegram messaging platform around 2016. Since then, it has been a mainstay of the information ecosystem for groups such as al-Dawlat al-Islamiyah (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ) and other foreign terrorist organisations (FTO). While the Salafi-Jihadi move- ment has been using Telegram, the general userbase of the platform has grown rapidly, it was 5th most downloaded mobile app worldwide in 2021 and 13th most used social platform globally. This paper uses examines how the Salafi-Jihadi movement operates on Telegram as a network of interconnected hubs where traffic and influence flow in multiple directions creating a vast dynam- ic ecosystem. This research offers the most comprehensive analysis, to date, of the information ecosystem of Salafi-Jihadi groups on Telegram. It is based on observation during 2021 of over 7,000 channels belonging to elements of the Salafi-Jihadi movement including IS, AQ, Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas, along with Salafi channels of importance to the movement.

It finds that just under 90% of the channels connect into a single giant network (including channels from IS, AQ, Taliban, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas). This means they are part of an interconnected ecosystem which comprise sub-clusters that have varying degrees of shared meaning. They often share common sources of content, frequently those channels on the Salafi side of the Salafi-Jihadi nexus. Such channels create a permissive environment in which Salafi-Jihadi groups can target their intended audience, and share material to bolster their theological position to craft a specific religious identity. Furthermore, the most important Salafi channels are much more likely than other channels to be sharing join links to other channels. Despite the volume of data available via Telegram, with some notable exceptions, much of the analysis and commentary of the Salafi-Jihad movement on Telegram has been anecdotal or su- perficial, resulting in the image of very insular Jihadi communities just talking to themselves. In 2021, far from being driven off Telegram (or the internet) by EUROPOL led disruption efforts, the Salafi-Jihadi movement and the FTO elements within it, have reconfigured just as a flock of birds adjusts in flight to the attack of a predator. In 2022 they continue to exploit the platform.

Keywords

Salafi-Jihadi movement, Telegram, strategic communication

You can download the full magazine files in PDF by clicking here, in ePub by clicking here.